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ON THE BEHAVIOR OF FISCAL POLICY WITH COSTLY 
EXPECTATIONS 
 
MARTIN GUZMAN 
 
RESUMEN 
 
Este trabajo extiende el modelo presentado en Talvi y Végh (2005) para la 
determinación de la política fiscal óptima, introduciendo características del 
tipo agent-based. Al igual que en Talvi y Végh (2005), el marco teórico es a la 
Barro (1979), pero en el modelo aquí presentado la formación de expectativas 
racionales está asociada a costos que dependen de la complejidad del sistema. 
Los agentes pueden elegir dos tipos de estrategias para la formación de 
expectativas: “comprar” la observación en cada período correspondiente al 
proceso de expectativas racionales, o seguir la tendencia sin pagar ningún 
costo. A diferencia de Talvi y Végh (2005), se muestra que la prociclicidad de 
la política fiscal no es necesariamente la conducta óptima del gobierno. 
Clasificación JEL: E32, E62, H30 
Palabras Clave: Política fiscal optima, ciclos, economía basada en agentes. 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper extends the Talvi and Végh (2005) model on the behavior of fiscal 
policy, introducing agent-based issues. Like in Talvi and Végh (2005), the 
theoretical framework is à la Barro (1979), but rational expectations are 
costly. The agents can choose between two strategies in forming expectations: 
buying costly rational expectations or freely following the trend. Unlike Talvi 
and Végh (2005), I show that procyclicality of fiscal policy is not necessarily 
the government’s optimal behavior. 
JEL Classification: E32, E62, H30 
Keywords: Optimal fiscal policy, cycles, agent-based economics. 
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I. Introduction 
There is a historical debate and a vast literature about how the behavior of 
fiscal policy should be determined. Basically, the focus is on how fiscal policy 
should be set over the business cycle. 
There have been different answers to this question. Standard Keynesian 
models imply that fiscal policy should be countercyclical: governments should 
increase public spending and lower taxes in bad times, and they should do the 
opposite during good times. In turn, tax smoothing models inspired in Barro 
(1979) imply that fiscal policy should remain essentially neutral over the 
business cycle. Hence, if policymakers followed Keynesian or Barro’s 
prescriptions, procyclical fiscal policy would never be observed. If a 
government followed Keynesian prescriptions, a positive correlation between 
tax rates and output growth (relative to the trend) and a negative correlation 
between public spending and output growth (relative to the trend) should be 
observed over the business cycle. Following tax smoothing prescriptions these 
correlations should be close to zero. 
A relevant question that arises is: What do data convey about these testable 
implications?  In OECD countries, fiscal policy is generally countercyclical or 
acyclical. For G-7 countries, the correlation between government consumption 
and output indeed appears to show no pattern and to be clustered around zero 
(see Fiorito and Kollintzas (1994) and Fiorito (1997)). For the United States, 
Barro (1990), Huang and Lin (1993), and Strazicich (1997) conclude that 
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federal tax rates are set in order to smooth out “predictable” changes in 
government spending. 
However, in many developing countries fiscal policies are procyclical. 
Gavin et al (1996) and Gavin and Perotti (1997a) point out that in Latin 
America, fiscal policy is procyclical. Talvi and Végh (2005) find that this is 
not only a Latin American phenomenon: procyclical fiscal policy is a common 
pattern in many -although not all- developing countries. 
Different explanations have been suggested for this behavior. A first 
answer holds that procyclical fiscal policy is mainly explained by the credit 
supply (cf. Aizenman, Gavin and Hausmann (1996), Gavin and Perotti (1997a, 
1997b), Catao and Sutton (2001) and Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004)). 
In bad times many developing countries cannot borrow, or they can only do so 
at very high interest rates; therefore, they cannot run deficits and have to cut 
spending. In booms, they can borrow more easily and they choose to do so, 
increasing public spending. However, as noted in Talvi and Végh (2005) and 
in Alesina and Tabellini (2005) this explanation has some problems. If the 
government knows that it will lose access to international credit markets 
during bad times, it is not clear why it will let the borrowing constraint to be 
binding. In fact, it could insure itself by accumulating reserves in good times, 
being less likely to face binding credit constraints in recessions. 
Alesina and Tabellini (2005) provide an alternative explanation, in which 
procyclical fiscal policy is suboptimal based upon political distortions and less 
than benevolent governments whose objective is to appropriate rents. In such a 
context, voters demand more public goods or lower taxes to prevent 
governments from appropriating rents during good times. 
Finally, Talvi and Végh (2005) give a different explanation, in which 
procyclical fiscal policy is optimal. They develop a model based on Barro’s 
assumptions, but in which running budget surpluses is costly because in such a 
situation the private sector puts pressure on the government to increase public 
spending. Considering that tax base fluctuations are much larger in developing 
countries than in the G-7 countries, full tax smoothing would imply 
developing countries running larger budget surpluses in good times and larger 
budget deficits in bad times compared to G-7 countries. However, given the 
political distortion mentioned before, a government that faces large (and 
perfectly anticipated) fluctuations in the tax base would find it optimal to run a 
procyclical fiscal policy (the optimal response of the government is to reduce 
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the tax rate in order to avoid the spending pressures). Therefore, they argue 
that the differences in fiscal policy between the G-7 countries and developing 
countries can be traced out to the fact that the tax base is much more volatile in 
developing countries than in the G-7 countries. 
This paper extends the Talvi and Végh (2005) model, introducing agent-
based issues. Like in Talvi and Végh (2005), the theoretical framework is à la 
Barro (1979), but rational expectations are costly. The agents can choose 
between two strategies in forming expectations: buying costly rational 
expectations or freely following the trend (as in Brock and Hommes (1997)). 
The cost of “buying” rational expectations depends on how “complex” the 
economy is, a concept that is defined as the sum of squares of the deviation 
between the short-run trend of GDP and the long-run trend on GDP. A 
countercyclical fiscal policy can reduce the complexity of the economy, also 
lowering the cost of buying rational expectations and lowering the probability 
of making mistakes when agents are trend followers. Therefore, a 
countercyclical fiscal policy has welfare-improving effects than can outweigh 
the political-economy costs associated to fiscal policy. Unlike Talvi and Végh 
(2005), I show that procyclicality of fiscal policy is not necessarily the 
government’s optimal behavior. 
II. The model 
The model is built in two steps. First, Brock and Hommes (1997)’s 
rationalization for heterogeneous agent models is presented. A behavioral 
argument to assume costly rational expectations is provided. Then, the Ramsey 
problem of the government is analyzed in a framework of heterogeneous 
expectations. Barro (1979)’s and Talvi and Vegh (2005)’s (henceforth 
TaV2005) results are presented, and then I show that the introduction of agent-
based issues may change the results previously obtained in the literature. 
A. Choice of expectations with costly information 
Brock and Hommes (1997) build a model of heterogeneous expectations, 
where the selection of strategies is endogenous and evolutionary: Those 
strategies that have been most successful in the recent past tend to be chosen 
with higher probability than less successful strategies. 
Let H be the cardinality of the set of strategies. The fitness of strategy h is 
given by a random utility model, 
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U 
ht
=U
ht
+ 
ht
                               (1) 
Equation (1) states that the fitness of strategy h in period t has two 
components: a deterministic part Uht, and a random part ht (the noise in the 
observed fitness of strategy h at date t). 
The fraction ht of individuals that choose strategy h is updated according 
to equation (1). Assuming that the noise ht is IID across types and drawn from 
a double exponential distribution, the probability that an agent chooses 
strategy h converges to 

ht
= 
exp(U
ht
)
 
h
 exp(U
ht
)
 (2) 
Therefore, the probability of choosing strategy h is higher as the recent 
performance given by (1) is higher. Given ht, the probability of choosing each 
strategy is less than 1 if  is less than .3 
In this model we assume that only two strategies are possible: the 
individuals can choose having rational expectations (R) about the 
determination of their income, but these expectations are costly; or they can 
choose to be trend followers (TF), which is costless. 
The cost of buying rational expectations is defined as a function of the 
“macroeconomic complexity of the economy”, a concept that I define in the 
following way. 
 
Definition 1: The macroeconomic complexity measure (CM) is defined as  
CM= 
t
 (y
t
SR
y
t
LR
)2 (3) 
where       is the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend of the GDP per capita calculated  
for restricted samples of the series, and      is the HP trend calculated taking 
the whole time-series.  
 
                                                 
3= corresponds to the case without noise, and the optimal forecast is chosen with probability 
1, while =0 corresponds to the the case of noise with infinite variance, so each strategy is 
chosen with probability 1/H. 
y
t
LR
 
 y
t
SR
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The rationale behind this definition relies on the fact that the difficulty in 
forming correct expectations is not the same in different economies. Figure 1 
shows that trends exhibit a uniform path in less volatile economies (e.g. 
Australia and US), while in more volatile ones (e.g. Argentina and Brazil) the 
trend changes when new data is added, i.e. when it is calculated recursively. 
According to this evidence, it is reasonable to assume that it is more difficult 
to form “correct” expectations in economies where a unique output trend is 
hard to identify than in the other ones. 
Given definition 1, the cost of buying rational expectations is assumed to 
be:  
C
R
t  = k (CM)   (4) 
with k'()>0. 
On the other hand, the individual may “follow the trend”, which is assumed 
to be costless. In particular, the individual observes the last HP recursive trend, 
and chooses such value as her expectation for the evolution of her income in 
the next period. However, this strategy can lead individuals to make mistakes, 
and mistakes are costly. The cost of mistakes is defined as:  
C
TF
t =(y
e
ty
R
t )
2 (5) 
where  y
R
t   is the actual per capita income, and by assumption              . 
The objective of the individuals is to minimize costs. Applying the Brock 
and Hommes (1997) benchmark previously introduced, the probability of 
buying rational expectations,     , is:  

 R
t = 
exp ((C
 R
t ))
exp ((C
 R
t )) + exp ((C
 TF
t1))
 (6) 
and the probability of being a trend follower is 
TF
t =1
R
t . 
From (4) to (6), heterogeneous expectations in equilibrium are rationalized. 
B. The optimal fiscal policy 
In this section a model à la Barro - Talvi and Végh is presented, but where 
expectations are heterogeneous. The goal is to find the Ramsey policy. First, 
Barro’s case is analyzed. Second, the TaV2005’s case is analyzed. Finally, the 
Ramsey policy of the costly and heterogeneous expectations case is obtained. 
 y
e
t  = y t
SR
 

R
t  
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It is assumed there is a large number of ex-ante identical agents. The 
economy is open to capital markets. Therefore, the real interest rate is 
exogenous (denoted by r). Income is ex-ante determined exogenously, but the 
government is capable of expanding or contracting income by means of fiscal 
policy. Let        be the process that generates income in the absence of 
government intervention (as stated before, is exogenous for individuals), 
where    is a set of exogenous variables. Then, the income in period t,    , is 
given by  
Y
t
 = F (x
t
,r) + d
t
    (7) 
where    is the primary fiscal deficit and 0 represents the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy (= 0 corresponds to the case of total ineffectiveness, and 0<<1 
corresponds to the case of partial effectiveness). 
With no government intervention, the variance of the income is given by  
Var(Y
t
) = Var(F()) (8) 
With government intervention, such variance is given by  
Var (Y
t
) = Var (F()) + 2Var (d
t
) + 2Cov (F(),d
t
)   (9) 
If fiscal policy is countercyclical (procyclical) the covariance between the 
exogenous process that determines the income and the primary fiscal deficit is 
negative (positive). According to that, it is straightforward to prove that for a 
countercyclical fiscal policy  
2Var (d
t
) < 2 |Cov (F(), d
t
)|                                     (10) 
and viceversa for a procyclical fiscal policy. Then, countercyclical 
(procyclical) fiscal policy diminishes (increases) the variance of the income. 
It is assumed that taxes are the instrument for fiscal policy. In particular, 
there is only one tax (income tax) and it is distortive. As in TaV2005, public 
spending is determined by two components: an exogenous component 
determined by fundamentals (ḡ, that is, the level of public spending in Barro 
(1979) that results form an optimal fiscal policy model (as in Lucas and Stokey 
(1983)), and an endogenous component, that is a non-negative, increasing and 
convex function of primary surplus. Formally,  
g
t
 = ḡ + f (t
t
Y
t
 g
t
)                  (11) 
with f () > 0, f '() > 0, f ''() > 0. Primary deficit is defined as  
F (x
t
,r)
 x
t
  Y
t
 
d
t
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d
t
 = (t
t
Y
t
 g
t
)                                                                                (12) 
where    is the tax rate in the period t. 
Equation (11) depicts a political distortion in the determination of public 
spending. According to the f () function, the higher the primary surplus, the 
higher the pressures from the private sector to the government to spend. The 
optimal response of the benevolent government to f () is to diminish the tax 
rate when the tax base increases in order to avoid such pressures, and 
viceversa during recessions. 
The problem of individuals is the maximization of the present value of 
intertemporal utility:  
max
{c
t
}
 
t=0

 tu(c
t
)       (13) 
subject to their budget constraint. The parameter  denotes the individuals’ 
discount factor, and c denotes consumption of the good. 
It is assumed that the individuals know the budget constraint of the 
government, and they internalize it into their own budget constraint. Therefore, 
the budget constraint of the private sector is  
 
 
                                                                                                                (14) 
 
 
 
where         is the function of taxes distortions, with h'() > 0,  h''() > 0 (cf. 
Barro (1979)). The government maximizes the social welfare, which is 
equivalent to solve:  
 
                                                                                            (15) 
 
That is, the government chooses the sequence of taxes that maximizes the 
social welfare by means of minimizing social costs. 
Given that the government can influence the evolution of the sequence of 
incomes through fiscal policy, then it can influence the value of CM (and 
t
t
 

t
  
c
t
(1+r)t
  = E 



 
t
  
[Y
t
 k (CM)] 
R
t
(1+r)
t  +  
t
  
[Y
t
 (y 
t
CP
y
t
)
2
] 
TF
t
(1+r)
t   
                 



 
t
  
[ ḡ + f (d
t
) + h(t
t
)]
(1+r)
t  
min
{t
t
}
E 






 
t=0

  
k (CM) 
R
t  + (yt
CP
y
t
)2 
TF
t  + [ḡ + f (dt) + h (tt)]
(1+r)t
 
h(t
t
) 
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consequently, the proportions i, i = R,TF). The corollary 2 of the following 
proposition shows this fact. 
 
Proposition 1  Let’s assume that there are two economies,  A and B,  such that        
                  . Moreover,  without  loss  of  generality,  let’s assume that             ,   
i= A, B.4  Let’s assume that  the  cycles of both economies are coincident ,  and  
that                               ,  which  implies                    in every t,  where           is  
defined as the rate of growth of the economy i in one period. Then, CM
A
>CM
B
.  
 
Proof 1 Let N be the maximum number of consecutive periods in which the 
economy i is in expansion or recession (by assumption of coincident cycles, 
this value is the same for both economies), that is assumed identical to the 
number of periods used to define the short run. Then,  in each period for which      
      is calculated we have the following possibilities: a) accumulated growth is 
equal to   (situation in which the last N periods were expansionary); b) 
accumulated growth is equal to               (situation in which in N1 of the last 
N periods were expansionary and the another one was recessive); c) the same 
logic applies to general situations in which Nj out of N last were 
expansionary and the others j were recessive, until is accumulated growth 
equal  to         .  Therefore,   there  are   N+1   possible  situations,    each  one  
associated to a probability of           . 
Then, we have  
CM
i
 = T  
1
N+1
 g
 2
i  
j=0
2N
 ( 
N2j
N
 )
2
                                                                  (16) 
where T is the number of times in which the cycle is “closed” (that is, the 
economy returns to    ). Therefore,  if                , it is concluded  that 
CM
A
>CM
B
. 
 
Corollary 1 The reduction of the volatility of the economy implies a reduction 
of the value of CM.  
Corollary 2 If >0, countercyclical fiscal policy diminishes the value of CM.  
 
                                                 
4 This assumtion only makes the proof easier. In fact, it is only necessary to assume equality. 
 y
LTA
 = y
LTB
 
Var(y
LTA
 )>Var(y
LTB
) |g
At
|>|g
Bt
|
1
N
g
i
y
LTi
= 0 
g
i
y
tST
(
N2
N ) g i 
g
i 1
N+1
 
y 
t
ST
 |g 
At
|>|g 
Bt
|
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However, problem (15) shows that reducing k is not the only objective of 
fiscal policy. To solve the optimal fiscal policy, the overall problem (15) is 
solved in stages. Firstly, Barro’s problem is analyzed. Then, the political 
distortion proposed by TaV2005 is added. Finally, problem (15) is solved, that 
is, the “costly expectations” case. The optimal fiscal policies corresponding to 
each case are then compared. In each proposition the assumptions made 
previously hold. 
 
Proposition 2 (Barro 1979). Let  
min
{t
t
} 
 
t=0

  
h(t
t
)
(1+r)
t                                                                         (17) 
be the problem of the government. Then, the optimal fiscal policy is acyclical.  
 
Proof 2 From (17), the first order condition is:  
h'(t
t
) + h'(t
t
) = 0                                                                       (18) 
where 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint of 
the government. Then,  
h'(t
t
)= 

1+
                                                                                     (19) 
That is, the sequence of taxes is independent of the product, being the optimal 
fiscal policy acyclical.  
 
Proposition 3 (Talvi and Végh (2005)). Let  
min
{t
t
}
 
t=0

  
f (t
t
Y
t
g
t
) + h (t
t
)
(1+r)
t                                                              (20) 
be the problem of the government. Then, the optimal fiscal policy is 
procyclical.  
 
Proof 3 From (20), the first order condition is:  
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(1+) h'(t
t
) + f '(t
t
Y
t
g
t
) Y
t
 =                             (21) 
Differentiating (21) with respect to Y, it is obtained  
(1+) h''(t
t
) 
dt
dY
 + f ''(t
t
Y
t
 g
t
)Y
 2
t  
dt
dY
 + f '(t
t
Y
t
g
t
) = 0                         (22) 
Then, it is concluded that  
dt
dY
 =  
f '(t
t
Y
t
g
t
)
(1+)h''(t
t
) + f ''(t
t
Y
t
g
t
)Y
 2
t
 < 0                                              (23) 
That is, the optimal response to an increase of the product is to lower the tax 
rate, and viceversa. Then, the optimal fiscal policy is procyclical.  
 
Proposition 4 (Behavior of fiscal policy with costly expectations). Let (15) be 
the problem of the government:  
min
{t
t
}
 E  






 
t=0

  
k(CM)
R
t  + (ytCP
y
t
)
2
TF
t + [g  + f (dt) + h(tt)]
(1+r)
t  
with the probabilities of choosing both types of expectations previously 
determined. Let’s assume that the fiscal policy is effective to smooth out the 
level of fluctuations of the income (i.e., >0). Then, the optimal fiscal policy 
is not necessarily procyclical. Particularly, we have: 
 
(a) k''(CM) 0 
   (a.1) if f '()>2
R
t |k'() 
dyt
dY
 
dy
dt
|  then the optimal fiscal policy is procyclical. 
   (a.2) if f '()=2
R
t |k'() 
dyt
dY
 
dy
dt
| then the optimal fiscal policy is acyclical. 
   (a.3) if f '()<2
R
t |k'() 
dyt
dY
 
dy
dt
| then the optimal fiscal policy is countercyclical. 
 
(b) k''(CM) < 0 
   (b.1) if                                                                                             then the  
optimality is determined analogously to the case (a). 
(1+) h''(t
t
) + f ''(t
t
Y
t
g
t
)Y
2
t  > 
R
t  |k''()| [(ytCP
(t
t
)y
LP
)' y '
tCP
]
2
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   (b.2) if                                                                                              then 
the optimality is determined inversely to the case (a).  
 
Proof 4 From (15), the first order condition is 
5
: 

R
t k'() 2 (yt
CP
(t
t
)y
LP
)' y '
t
CP
(t
t
) + (1+) h'(t
t
) + f '(t
t
Y
t
 g
t
)Y
t
 =        (24) 
Differentiating (24) with respect to Y, simplifying and rearranging, we get:  

R
t k''()[2(yt
CP
(t
t
)y
LP
)' y '
t
CP
(t
t
)]
2
 + 2
R
t k'() 
dy tCP
dY
 
dy
dt
 
+(1+) h''(t
t
) 
dt
dY
 + f ''(t
t
Y
t
 g
t
)Y
2
t  
dt
dY
 + f '(t
t
Y
t
 g
t
) = 0                      (25) 
where 2k'() 
dy tCP
dY
 
dy
dt
 < 0 , because k'()>0, 
dy tCP
dY
 >0, and 
dy
dt
 <0 by assumption. 
Therefore, it is concluded that  
dt
dY
 = 
f '(t
t
Y
t
 g
t
) 2
R
t k'() 
dy tCP
dY
 
dy
dt
 (1+) h''(t
t
) + f ''(t
t
Y
t
 g
t
)Y
 2
t +
R
t k''()[2(yt
CP
(t
t
)y
LP
)' y '
t
CP
(t
t
)]
2
     (26) 
(a) k''(CM) 0 
(a.1) if f '() > 2
R
t |k'() 
dyt
dY
 
dy
dt
 | then  
dt
dY
 < 0; 
(a.2) if f '() = 2
R
t |k'() 
dyt
dY
 
dy
dt
 | then  
dt
dY
 = 0; 
(a.3) if f '() < 2
R
t |k'() 
dyt
dY
 
dy
dt
 | then  
dt
dY
 > 0; 
(b) k''(CM) < 0 
(b.1) if                                                                                                         the  
denominator in (26) is positive and the optimality is determined analogously to 
the case (a). 
 
                                                 
5 Second order effects are excluded. 
(1+) h''(t
t
) + f ''(t
t
Y
t
g
t
)Y
2
t < 
R
t |k''()| [(ytCP
(t
t
)y
LP
)' y '
tCP
]
2
(1+) h''(t
t
) + f ''(t
t
Y
t
g
t
)Y
2
t > 
R
t |k''()| [(ytCP
(t
t
)y
LP
)' y '
tCP
]
2
ON THE BEHAVIOR OF FISCAL POLICY WITH COSTLY EXPECTATIONS 
 
41 
(b.2) if                                                                                                the 
denominator in (26) is negative and the optimality is determined inversely to 
the case (a). 
  
Therefore, it has been proven that when (a) expectations are costly, (b) 
fiscal policy is at least partially effective to smooth the fluctuations of income 
and (c) the cost of buying rational expectations is an increasing function of the 
macroeconomic complexity of the economy, then the optimal fiscal policy is 
not necessarily procyclical, even when there are political distortions à la Talvi 
and Végh. In fact, when the marginal benefits of avoiding the political 
distortions do not outweigh the marginal costs of higher instability, the optimal 
fiscal policy is countercyclical. 
III. Concluding remarks 
Building an agent-based framework in which heterogeneous expectations 
are introduced, this paper shows that a previous result of the literature about 
optimal behavior of fiscal policy may be modified. The central result lies on 
proposition 4, which shows that when there are two types of expectations, both 
associated to costs, the optimal behavior of fiscal policy cannot be univocally 
determined. Particularly, there are scenarios in which, unlike Barro (1979) and 
Talvi and Végh (2005), the optimal behavior of the government could be to 
pursue a countercyclical fiscal policy. 
There is an issue that still remains unsolved. If it is optimal for a country to 
set a countercyclical fiscal policy and, however, the fiscal policy happens to be 
procyclical: Why is this so?  A plausible hypothesis for future research is that, 
as well as individuals do not always succeed in forecasting their permanent 
income, and this task might be particularly difficult in contexts of high 
complexity (an hypothesis with antecedents in Galiani et al (2003), Heymann 
et al (2001) and Leijohufvud (1973) among others), the same forecasting 
difficulties might apply to a government. It might be the case that a 
government overestimates its permanent income and consequently it decides a 
fiscal policy that based on that estimation is considered as countercyclical, but 
based on the ex-post realization of the permanent income is revealed to be 
procyclical. If this is the case, procyclicality would not be optimal, but it 
would be the outcome of misperceptions, an outcome that ex-post can be 
classified as suboptimal. 
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Figure 1 
GDP per capita in constant dollars, HP recursive trends 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on OECD and Inter American Development Bank data. 
 
